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Abstract: Although the term Strategic Communication seems to be a rising topic in
communication studies, it is obvious that the term has been hardly visualized and
explained from the U.S. government perspective in academic work. This paper
theoretically visualizes strategic communication processes. The Department of State and
the Department of Defense streamlined the use of strategic communication in different
terms but they both focus on using soft power over hard power to gain support from
foreign audiences through communication. Both departments especially after the
9/11attacks have developed programs to win hearts and minds of the target audience.
This paper shows the salient process of strategic communication programs and
conceptualizes principles of strategic communication from their perspectives. This paper
after all illustrates the processes for theorizing strategic communication.

Keywords: strategic communication, Department of State, Department of Defense, public
diplomacy

Introduction
It is convenient and safe to mention that the term strategic communication carries some kind
of meaning holistic but nebulous despite the term’s popularity after 9/11 in the United States
as the George W. Bush administration popularized it (Halloran, 2007). Over the last few
years, a wide variety of industrial, academic, governmental, and non-profit institutions have
used the term in a form of their own interpretation, which lead to convoluted confusion while
they attempt to preoccupy supreme authority in terms of agreed-upon meaning of strategic
communication. Although the term literally seems to refer to conversation, dialogue, and any
form of opinion exchanges, these institutions tend to be subordinate to self-obsession of
righteousness to insist that definition and usage of strategic communication should be
understood and performed under each one’s independent guidance. In other words, it will not
be feasible to share a common concept of strategic communication until the very
representative and unified consensus is accepted among the strategic communication
community.
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Hence this study explores a host of claims for definitions of strategic communication and its
applications being used by multiple institutions and even individuals in pursuit of
conceptualizing and theorizing strategic communication. It also offers ongoing processes of
domestic and international policy-making of the United States, explained from historical
occasions to illustrate the country’s strategic communication applications throughout political
and social science theories related to processes of communication, including confused usage
of strategic communication which the government agencies, academic researchers, NGOs and
private sector employees attempt to preoccupy. In a simple way, Figure 1 -- called SC Birth
Visualization by this study -- presents the disarrayed abuse of wording to define and
conceptualize strategic communication.

Figure 1: SC Birth Vizualization

What is strategic communication?
In accordance with usage of the term strategic communication in the United States, operators
of strategic communication are supposed to be able to strategically communicate with their
audiences. However, now that there are many different definitions of strategic
communication with self-interpreted understandings of those definitions from a broad range
of claimers, one superior strategic communication definition grounded in a national
agreement is definitely needed in minimizing the terminology confusion. In addition, this
study explores to increase efficiency of strategic communication, which is particularly
emphasized in the area of national security where an official definition of strategic
communication, propagated by the White House, not by one of the government agencies or
departments, would enforce conformity to other claimers when using the concept and
definition of strategic communication.
In doing so, the government efforts to develop strategic communication as an authoritative
theory that applies to the sophisticated process of policy-making can result in stable
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maintenance of national security because the absence of official definition allows another
confusing birth of strategic communication definition and application at the coiner’s interests,
which can conflict with the government interests (as will be discussed in a later section).
A thorough review over definitions of strategic communication is inevitable in generating the
superior definition, which should integrate as many adoptable areas of strategic
communication as possible in order to settle in social consensus aiming at successful policymaking that will eventually lead to securing national security. It needs to be clarified that the
term strategic communication, first of all, gets confusing whether an “s” is added at the end.
It seems that industrial or public relations organizations prefer to define the term with the “s.”
Typing “strategic communications” on Google leads to some recognizable definitions for the
industry use. O’Malley Communications Inc, a PR company, defines it as “using corporate or
institutional communications to create, strengthen or preserve, among key audiences, opinion
favourable to the attainment of institutional/corporate goals” (O'Malley, 2012). Another
website states that strategic communications is “a process guided by the relentless pursuit of
answers to deceptively simple questions [such as] who has to think or act differently for that
to happen? What would prompt them to do it? ” (Communication Leadership Institute, 2012).
Another institution argues: “strategic communications is an art – the art of presenting ideas
clearly, concisely, persuasively and systematically in a timely manner to the right people …
maximizing available resources and positioning your organization to be proactive”
(Communication Leadership Institute, 2012). These definitions evidently show the discrete
usage or meaning of the term, with “s.”
Public or non-profit organizations, on the other hand, adopt the term without “s.” A study
conducted by UNICEF states:
„Strategic Communication is an evidence-based, results-oriented process, undertaken in
consultation with the participant group(s), intrinsically linked to other programme
elements, cognisant of the local context and favouring a multiplicity of communication
approaches, to stimulate positive and measurable behaviour and social change. (UNICEF
2005: xiii)

The System Staff College of the United Nations also sees strategic communication as an
important tool to carry out its humanitarian work by defining, “strategic communication takes
a client-centred approach, it involves the development of programs designed to influence the
voluntary behaviour of target audiences [and actors] to achieve management objectives”
(Klaverweide, 2006: 4). Another global organization The World Bank states that strategic
communication is “a stakeholder- or client-centered approach to promote voluntary changes
in people’s knowledge, attitudes, and behaviors to achieve development objectives”
(Cabanero-Verzosa and Garcia, 2009: 5). Similarly, strategic communication can be referred
to as a process of using communication, “aiming at increasing the level of awareness and
creating change in behaviour of actors and the relationship amongst and between actors”
(Klaverweide, 2006: 6). In a nutshell, strategic communication in non-profit organizations as
opposed to industrial ones is used to emphasize a group rather than an individual, social
change rather than personal profit, and relationships rather than goals.
In contrast to moderate efforts from profit and non-profit organizations to define strategic
communication(s), those of college level scholars excluding military academies are
surprisingly sparse and meager. Few definitions are findable: for example, strategic
communication is about “dealing with issues that might jeopardize an organization’s very
survival”; it is understood to convey the best message “through the right channels, measured
against well-considered organizational and communications-specific goals”; and it is about
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having “a plan, not simply reacting and responding” (IDEA, 2011). On the other hand,
strategic communication as defined in government is more abundant, robust, focused, and
cohesive.
Although the U.S. government began to recognize the importance of defining, planning, and
implementing strategic communication in less than one decade, it is worth noting that the
White House has been reluctant to conceptualize what strategic communication is, and it has
been anemic about how President directs the use of strategic communication to his cabinet
members as Commander in Chief or Chief Executive Officer. Rather, the highest hierarchical
organization allows two paramount organizations in charge of maintaining national security
to develop strategic communication from scratch: the Department of Defense (DOD) and the
Department of State (DOS). In fact, the former has taken more aggressive approach to
developing definition and usage of strategic communication since 2006 than the latter
unlikely to use the term strategic communication explicitly because the States Department
appears to have a tendency of preferring the term public diplomacy to strategic
communication. A hypothesis is built to explain that these terms are denoting the same
meaning in just different spellings. A report by Government Accountability Office states,
“We use the terms ‘public diplomacy’,(…) and ‘strategic communication’ interchangeably”
(U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2009: 1). Of course, both terms can often share the
same meaning carrying the connotation: using neither physical nor hard power to engage
people abroad in favor of the U.S. government policies and interests.
DOD initiated its official effort to take advantage of preoccupying strategic communication
as a pioneer government agency by publishing the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review
Execution Roadmap for Strategic Communication. The Roadmap defines strategic
communication from the military perspective:
„Focused United States Government processes and efforts to understand and engage key
audiences to create, strengthen or preserve conditions favorable to advance national
interests and objectives through the use of coordinated information, themes, plans,
programs, and actions synchronized with other elements of national power.” (QDR
Execution Roadmap for Strategic Communication 2006: 3)

A several years later, 2009, DOD reintroduced the amended definition:
„Focused United States Government efforts to understand and engage key audiences to
create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of US
Government interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs,
plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of
national power.” (The Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 2009: 518)

Since 2006, it has been significant for DOD to be determined to become the chief player of
using strategic communication in terms of authority; it offers a host of conceptions and
specific points of strategic communication. The 2008 Principles of Strategic Communication
report, a short white paper, notes that strategic communication – as an emerging and
extremely pertinent joint concept, but still a developing concept – is “the orchestration and/or
synchronization of actions, images and words to achieve a desired effect” (2008: 4). The
report for the first time among all official documents suggested nine principles of strategic
communication, taking a bold step to develop strategic communication. The principles are:
Leadership-Driven, Credible, Dialogue, Unity of Effort, Responsive, Understanding,
Pervasive, Results-Based, and Continuous. (2008: 4-6). DOD advances the concept of
strategic communication in its 2009 report, asserting that strategic communication in a
broader sense is “the process of integrating issues of audience and stakeholder perception into
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policy-making, planning, and operations at every level.”(Report on Strategic Communication
2009: 1). In light of formulating strategic communication DOD inserted the new word
process. Strategic communication as “process” appears to refer to an effort of improvement
for an alignment of actions and information that requires no structures or facilities. In other
words, strategic communication is an intangible entity to communicate with: no need for
tangible capabilities since it is just a “process.” DOD mired itself into the common
inadvertent process of over broadening and/or overdeveloping strategic communication when
creating a new concept. Because strategic communication is a “process,” there should be a
roomful of vacant space for others in other industries to create another concept of strategic
communication that can even exacerbate DOD’s pioneer efforts in preoccupying the authority
of functioning strategic communication. Hence it is necessary for DOD to try to
conceptualize strategic communication in a narrow sense, rather than viewing it as a just
“process” that could be implemented without any support of organizational and governmental
functions.
DOD’s formidable rival is the Department of Defense (DOS) when it comes to using and
operating strategic communication despite the absence of explicit definition of the term from
DOS. As mentioned before, DOS has never defined what strategic communication is and how
it is used for the department’s interests although Bureau of Public Affairs: Strategic
Communications serves as one of the divisions for DOS (see US Department of States
website). Not surprisingly, the bureau provides no information or definition directly related to
strategic communication. It seems to be fair to assume that DOS with its main goals of
informing and influencing foreign audiences is unlikely to use the term strategic
communication, which connotes militaristic meaning that is prone to conscious or
subconscious resistance of foreign audiences to the U.S. government foreign policies; rather
DOS plays its role with the term public diplomacy, which represents apparatus of building
state-to-state relations as well as state-to-audience relationships, while DOD’s role is melted
into strategic communication when accomplishing its goals in battlefields without using
military power. In short, even if the two terms mean nearly same, DOS prefers to call it
public diplomacy.
Despite that fact that DOS has barely used the term strategic communication, President
George W. Bush in 2006 devolved authority to DOS as the lead for strategic communication,
placing it “in charge of the administration's worldwide strategic communication” (Young and
Pincus, 2008). And the Bush administration’s Strategic Communication and Public
Diplomacy Policy Coordinating Committee in collaboration with DOS published a report
including an ambiguous but integrated concept of the two terms, stating, “Public diplomacy
and strategic communication should always strive to support our nation’s fundamental values
and national security objectives” (U.S Department of State 2007: 2). It also adds that
communication and public diplomacy activities should:





Underscore our commitment to freedom, human rights and the dignity and equality of
every human being
Reach out to those who share our ideals
Support those who struggle for freedom and democracy
Counter those who espouse ideologies of hate and oppression.
(U.S. Department of State 2007: 2)

After President Obama took office in 2009, DOS focuses on public diplomacy instead of
strategic communication with regard to managing its role. Public diplomacy like strategic
communication carries multiple definitions with no unanimous agreement. But defining the
term public diplomacy is a bit simpler than strategic communication because public
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diplomacy, the orthodox field of government operation, limits private industries to interfere.
According to the Public Diplomacy Alumni Association website (2011), three agreed-upon
definitions are as follows:
1. Seeking to promote the national interest of the United States through understanding,
informing and influencing foreign audiences (DOS).
2. Official government efforts to shape the communications environment overseas in
which American foreign policy is played out, in order to reduce the degree to which
misperceptions and misunderstandings complicate relations between the U.S. and
other nation (Hans N. Tuch, author of Communicating With the World).
3. Promoting the national interest and the national security of the United States through
understanding, informing, and influencing foreign publics and broadening dialogue
between American citizens and institutions and their counterparts abroad (About U.S.
Public Diplomacy: 2011).
Given the definitions, it is not nonsense to say that public diplomacy can be defined as a
government’s strategies to implement foreign policy and achieve national interests through
communication with people of foreign nations by providing information and outreach
programs for them. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton elaborates on the strategy, arguing that
successful public diplomacy is embodied by making public engagement “every diplomat’s
duty through town-hall meetings and interviews with the media, organized outreach, events in
provincial towns and smaller communities, student exchange programs, and virtual
connections that bring together citizens and civic organizations” (Clinton 2010: 22).
With the combination of confusing usage and connotation of DOD and DOS in terms of
clarifying the two terms, Congress played a go-between role in encouraging the White House
to address the confusion of strategic communication terminology, introducing the Duncan
Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009. In particular, it required
President Obama “to submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on a
comprehensive interagency strategy for public diplomacy and strategic communication”
(National Framework for Strategic Communication 2010: 1). In response to the congressional
requirement, the White House published a white paper titled National Framework for
Strategic Communication in March 2010. In the cover letter, President Obama writes, “I am
providing a report on my Administration's comprehensive interagency strategy for public
diplomacy and strategic communication of the Federal government.” (Obama 2010: 1)
After admitting that the term strategic communication became popular over the few years but
diverse uses of the term causes significant confusion, the white paper epitomizes a wide
range of usage, applications, and aims of strategic communication. First of all, the paper
refers to strategic communication(s) as: “(a) the synchronization of words and deeds and how
they will be perceived by selected audiences, as well as (b) programs and activities
deliberately aimed at communicating and engaging with intended audiences, including those
implemented by public affairs, public diplomacy, and information operations professionals”
(National Framework for Strategic Communication 2010: 2-5). In the definition, the White
House apparently subordinates public diplomacy to strategic communication, rather than
using them as synonyms. It in turn offers the definition of public diplomacy, which seeks
promotion for “the national interest of the United States through understanding, engaging,
informing, and influencing foreign publics and by promoting mutual understanding between
the people of the United States and people from other nations around the world” (ibid: 6).
To represent the aforementioned definitions in a visible fashion, the following table is added:
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Entity of Strategic
Communication(s)
PR Firms
UNICEF

Department of
Defense

Department of
State
The White House

Definition
Using corporate or institutional communications to create, strengthen
or preserve, among key audiences, opinion favourable to the
attainment of institutional/corporate goals.
An evidence-based, results-oriented process, undertaken in
consultation with the participant group(s), intrinsically linked to other
programme elements, cognisant of the local context and favouring a
multiplicity of communication approaches, to stimulate positive and
measurable behaviour and social change.
Focused United States Government efforts to understand and engage
key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable
for the advancement of US Government interests, policies, and
objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes,
messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all
instruments of national power.
Promoting the national interest and the national security of the United
States through understanding, informing, and influencing foreign
publics and broadening dialogue between American citizens and
institutions and their counterparts abroad.
a) The synchronization of words and deeds and how they will be
perceived by selected audiences, as well as (b) Programs and
activities deliberately aimed at communicating and engaging with
intended audiences, including those implemented by public affairs,
public diplomacy, and information operations professionals.

Table 1: Various definitions of strategic commnunication

In the following explanations, the paper emphasizes the importance of synchronization,
which coordinates words and deeds from the beginning of policy-making. Synchronization of
words and deeds takes the communicative value of actions into account, and it eventually
sends messages to audiences who interpret them, based on their culture and beliefs. In other
words, strategic communication through synchronization of words and deeds “as well as the
effective execution of deliberate communication and engagement” is the key to
accomplishment of successful U.S. foreign policy (ibid: 5). In addition, the report enumerates
priorities when communication efforts are made for strategic communication affecting
foreign audiences’ belief and behavior. The priorities are to convince foreign audiences to
“recognize areas of mutual interest” with the United States, to persuade foreign audiences to
“see the United States as a constructive role player,” and to encourage foreign audiences to
regard “the United States as a respectful partner in efforts to meet complex global challenges”
(ibid: 6). It is clear that this report originating from the White House officially announces the
definition, goals, and positions of strategic communication including the boundary of public
diplomacy, which is still an essential part of strategic communication. The report implies that
strategic communication is critical to upholding global legitimacy and performing the U.S.
policy.
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Historical and Theoretical Origins of Strategic Communication
The concept or the notion of strategic communication is not built in a day, nor does it come
out of nowhere albeit relatively seemingly fresh. Tracing far back to strategic
communication’s origins rests on the era of Aristotle as the basic theory of communication
for individuals and organizations is derived from human nature. In ancient Greece,
communication known as the use of language to stimulate the public to think and act in a
certain way was synonymous with the art of rhetoric (Argenti 2009). In Aristotle’s book, The
Art of Rhetoric, the root of communication theory is found: “Every speech is composed of
three parts: the speaker, the subject of which he treats, and the person to whom it is
addressed, I mean the hearer, to whom the end or object of the speech refers” (quoted in
Donfried 1974: 35). Aristotle refers to “the speaker” as creator, “the subject” as message, and
“the hearer” as the public. After Aristotle, there were numerous elites of developing
communication throughout Roman Empire and the Dark/Middle Ages, but it could not be
noticed as a form of strategic communication until Pope Gregory XV established a new
“papal department,” the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith, in 1622 (Taylor 1995:
111). The term propaganda, then, was referred to as efforts to convince a large number of
people about faith in Christianity and political leaders. It appeared that propaganda using a
method of persuasion settled in as a model of communication; however, going through
modern wars from World War I, propaganda was associated with the negative connotation as
a tool for disseminating information distorted, manipulative, deceptive, and irrational.
Framing messages with the organized attempt to change behavior, affect belief, and inculcate
attitude of target audience is the common theory of modern propaganda.
By relating propaganda with strategic communication armed with “programs and activities
deliberately aimed at communicating and engaging with intended audiences,” (National
Framework for Strategic Communication 2010: 2) it is difficult to deny that strategic
communication is eligible to take advantage of both negative and positive sides of
propaganda’s tenet (Taylor 1995: 111). The former represents lying and deception to make
the target audience fall for the message the sender fabricates, whereas the latter underscores
the benefit of sharing information so the target audience would have a chance to know better.
There exists a tiny line between propaganda and information engagement, depending on who
uses which one; shortly, it is propaganda if the enemy uses.
During World War II, the world witnessed vicious propaganda competitions. Political
ideologies between totalitarianism and democracy were center located in triggering the battle.
Deciding to play the lead for the war, the U.S. government performed not only striking
physical blows at the enemy states but also bombarding psychological persuasion or
propaganda at audiences of the states. Reluctant to use the word propaganda, the government
established two organizations by explicitly excluding the word but including information and
strategic: Office of War Information (OWI) and Office of Strategic Services (OSS). OWI
dealt with white propaganda while OSS was in charge of black propaganda (Taylor 1995:
226). Information covered with black propaganda was used to vilify and demonize the enemy
in a covert operation covered with false sources, fabrications, and lies. White propaganda, by
contrast, came with overt information sources, informing foreign and domestic audiences that
the U.S. government tried to influence and persuade them to support its efforts to win the war
in an issue of good versus evil. In order for the government to accomplish the victory of the
information or propaganda competition, it cultivated propagandists utilizing any possible
media such as posters, advertising, leaflets, radio, books, cartoons, magazines, and
newspapers. All the media aimed to foment the foreign audience to resent their soldiers and
to urge the domestic audience to embrace inconvenience and sacrifice in the name of
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patriotism. The government efforts to win the competition showed that propaganda through
media information dissemination at target audience could be understood as psychological
persuasion that encourages the audience to change or maintain attitude and belief toward
national goals in a form of communication. In a narrow sense, Baran and Davis (2005) argue
that communication in terms of sending messages to change target audience’s attitude is
equivalent to well-organized propaganda as the theory of symbolic interactionism suggests
that when people receive meaning on a certain event through symbolic message delivered by
media, the meaning controls those people’s opinion and attitude. Similarly based on the
definition and objectives of the White House, strategic communication with the activities of
aiming at communicating and engaging with intended audiences to affect their beliefs and
perspectives is not massively different from the core of propaganda. In addition, public
diplomacy, according to the United States Information Agency’s definition (About U.S.
Public Diplomacy 2011), supposed to promote “national interest through influencing foreign
publics and broadening dialogue between American citizens and their counterparts abroad”
shares common elements with propaganda. In other words, strategic communication and
public diplomacy accommodate some amount of conceptual overlap with propaganda even
though the U.S. government is likely to dislike this idea.
The end of WWII indicated another advent of war era: the Cold War. The tension between
the Soviet Unions and the United States reflected a new faith in the power of propaganda. It
was ironic that the world after WWII strived to eradicate propaganda through “denazification
propaganda,” which aimed at annihilating militarism and imperialism (Taylor, 1995). In light
of the efforts to rebuild the world damaged by the war, the U.S. government had to spend
billions of dollars to fight against the spread of communism and totalitarianism. But the
Vietnam War dragged the government into another battle of propaganda against communism.
Since the United States kept itself from using the term propaganda in battlefields from WWI,
it was necessary for the country to come up with a new communication method to conduct
psychological persuasion operations in Vietnam. President Lyndon B. Johnson said in May
1965, “We must be ready to fight in Vietnam, but the ultimate victory will depend upon the
hearts and the minds of the people who actually live out there … for the cause of freedom
throughout the world” (Johnson 1965: para. 8.). From his speech, the U.S. army picked the
words the hearts and minds to develop as a campaign, “Winning hearts and minds of the
Vietnamese people” who were encouraged to resist “the North Vietnamese communists and
the home-grown insurgents, the Viet Cong” (Bell 2008). Major Gen. Ed Lansdale privileging
values on words and music over guns to win the war organized a group of people who could
sing and create music in support of the campaign (ibid.). He hoped that people in Vietnam
were persuaded to consider American soldiers friends, not invaders.
Though the Vietnam War turned out to be one of the greatest humiliations in the U.S. military
history, the spirit of “Winning hearts and minds” has been passed down and regarded as an
important part of military operations. Koch points out that the U.S. military planned to use
the campaign for the war in Iraq from 2003 with the more sophisticated operational program,
called PSYOP or psychological operations. The plan was to deliver public messages to Iraq
insurgents and citizens that as long as they do not attack the U.S. soldiers and provide
assistance to find WMDs, insurgents would go free and citizens would be rewarded.
Disseminating the messages was carried out via PSYOP devices such as leaflets, radio and
television broadcasts, and more modernly, cellular phone texting (Koch 2003).
Although no official report on the effectiveness of PSYOP has been out yet, the winning
hearts and minds campaign goes on. Gen. Stanley McChrystal, Commander of U.S. Forces
Afghanistan, emphasized the importance of maintaining the campaign in 2009. He reported
the Obama administration that without the hearts and minds of the people, the war would fail,
saying that if Afghanistan people “view us as occupiers and the enemy, we can't be successful
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and our casualties will go up dramatically” (Keck, 2009). His approach to the campaign can
be conceptually analyzed that winning the hearts and minds of Afghan civilians would lead
the U.S. troops to the places Taliban hides. Thus it is safe to point out that the inevitable
principle of the winning hearts and minds, at least for the U.S. military forces, is to obtain
foreign audience’s support by understanding, informing, educating, and persuading them. Not
surprising if the winning hearts and minds campaign is already embedded into one of the
main pillars of strategic communication for the forces.
Not only has the government agencies adopted and developed strategic communication, but
also politics is another robust field of strategic communication being taken on. With the
emergence of television, which became one of the dominant media in the 1950s and 1960s,
politicians especially for presidential candidates had to undergo a new adjustment to TV
debates as a strategic communication form. Richard Nixon and John F. Kennedy fell into the
first political TV debate generation who adapted their debate strategies to meet the TV
environment. On September 26, 1960, 70 million Americans tuned in to watch “the first-ever
televised presidential debate” between the two candidates; the program was titled, “Great
Debate” (Allen 1960). Before the debate broadcast, voters thought Nixon would defeat
Kennedy by a large margin, but Nixon’s unorganized TV appearance wearing ill-fitting shirt
and no make-up that made him look more senile and less handsome than his opponent, who
appeared confident and fit to TV, resulted in giving Americans the youngest president then
43. Voters agreed after the election that the first TV debate served as a significant reason for
electing Kennedy (ibid). The TV debate and election result became the turning point for those
pursuing political career. They began to realize the rising power of TV as media, being
concerned more about how to use TV to appeal to voters rather than to promote political
engagement such as rallies (Baran and Davis 2005). Politicians on TV had to adjust “their
electioneering techniques to meet the presentational demands of the medium” (Owen 1995:
138).
TV changed political strategic communication. Before the TV era, it was likely that
candidates focused on campaigns, which let them have a chance to speak for their positions,
opinions, and beliefs on certain issues. But after the Great Debate, candidates were prone to
staging pseudo-events that TV would cover more of them. Since then, political campaigns
became journalist centered, meaning that the TV media spoke for candidates, and TV
reporters and commentators, who decided what is newsworthy about candidates and their
campaigns, overshadowed performances of candidates (ibid). Politicians, rather than
objecting to the phenomena, had no choice but to conform to the new era of media culture as
the new strategic communication form. Such surroundings can be explained by the theory of
media intrusion. The theory suggests that media intrude into and take over politics to the
degree that politics have become subverted (Baran and Davis 2005). If written easily, the
media, TV in particular, are capable of controlling politics. But one question is raised: What
if the theory would only represent the limited period when TV shockingly served as a new
medium. The 1992 presidential campaign could give a clear answer why TV effects are still
strong even after the 21st century. The campaign between Bill Clinton and George Bush was
considered one-step evolved communication activity, as the candidates appeared on talk
shows, local newscasts via satellite, and ads as well as formal debates in order to get their
messages out. The influence of TV even got bigger. While appearing on a variety of TV
programs, the candidates also spent over $133 million together including Ross Perot on TV
ads (Roberts 1995: 179). Their strategic communication to win voters’ hearts and minds
ended up enriching TV companies, which raked in windfall profits in sails of political
advertising spots.
The TV influence on politics seems to stay stronger even in the digital age as the most recent
presidential campaign records indicate that President Obama spent $250 million on television
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ads in 2008, while John McCain spent $ 80 million (Gordon, 2008). The theory is vindicated
again that political strategic communication for TV is to buy ads and comply with TV
stations’ requests asking candidates to show up on talk shows, one-on-one interviews, and
comedy programs for ratings. There is one assumption why politicians allow the media to
control their fate. Because their ultimate goal is not to inform or educate the public but to win
the election, they strategically make an approach to the media essential to influence voters’
decision. In general, their communication strategy to win the election condones the media
control on politics in exchange for obtaining positive coverage.
Historically speaking, the concept and the practice of strategic communication has been gone
through the processes of persuading target audiences by using communication tools,
including the media. Before the emergence of television, strategic communicators used
personal dialogue, print materials and radio. With television and the Internet, strategic
communicators take advantage of quick and visual tools to inform and persuade the
audiences. Depending on who uses strategic communication, people see it as propaganda,
public relations, public diplomacy or simple communication action. However, to better
understand strategic communication, all integrated historical approaches are helpful.

Visualizing and Theorizing in Strategic Communication Process
The United States government strives to be the front-runner of introducing concepts strategic
communication since its three agencies individually engage in promoting the concept by
sticking to their policies. The three are: the Defense Department, the State Department, and
the National Security Council of the White House. They adopt tactics of public
announcement through publication on the media or those of inside-use-only- classification to
develop the concept and usage of strategic communication. They view strategic
communication as a persuasive vehicle for informing, influencing, and educating intended or
even unintended audiences. In short, strategic communication is the core for the government
to persuade domestic and foreign audiences in favor of the U.S. national interests and
security.
The government ultimately aims at one goal in terms of maximizing the power of strategic
communication: having an impact on target audience with no exercise of physical power. In
order for the government to facilitate strategic communication, it organizes elaborating
strategic communication processes in hopes that the target audience would not play against
the U.S. national interests, but rather they would respond to the interests. This is the right
timing for a strategic communication project to be born.
It should not be uncommon that the initiation of the project begins with recognition of the
principal problem or issue on which project participants or practitioners need to focus (step
1), followed by research to have deeper understanding of the situation (step 2). Before
moving to next step, they need to learn about the basic principle of communication known as
the message influence model illustrating that a sender of information and idea intends to
transform them into a message or a theme that is conveyed through a channel to a receiver.
And the receiver is likely to comply with the same way as the sender’s intention, so the
receiver acts in a specific manner.
After the step of research, they establish objectives (step 3), which deliberately lead to
creation of messages that represent a concept of the project (step 4). These are significant
processes of identifying which behavior or attitude needs altering for which group of people.
Once the messages are confirmed, they have to define people they want to inform, influence,
educate or persuade (step 5). These people are better known as target audiences who are
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selected as accessible and amenable through strategic communication, which can be either
overt or covert.
Developing specific and articulate strategy in a form of campaign or advertising retaining the
intended message or theme is the next step to reach the target audiences (step 6). And then, it
is time to implement the communication strategy with efficient use of the media (step 7). In
the final step, they monitor a progress of the implementation (step 8), or reorganize detailed
strategy if the progress turns out ineffective (step 8-1). When the reorganization process is
unavoidable, the practitioners must be determined to go back to the previous or further
previous steps until the progress gets back on the right track. Because in a worst scenario they
could end up aborting the entire strategic communication that leaves permanent damage on
the government, the first three steps require extraordinary effort and elaboration. The entire
steps of strategic communication, called the Flow of SC Process, are illustrated in a logical
order in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Flow of strategic communication

Today’s relationship between Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy
Since 9/11, the U.S. government until 2009 invested at least $10 billion in improving
communication systems designed to advance the strategic objectives of the United States,
expecting to increase constructive views of foreign audience toward its efforts.
Unfortunately, foreign public opinion on the U.S. efforts of building good relationships with
foreigners stayed sour despite the collective efforts by DOS, DOD, and many other agencies.
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The U.S. Government Accountability Office of Congress (2009, p.15) suggests a possible
means of addressing the cynical foreign view on the United States that “U.S. strategic
communication and public diplomacy efforts can play in promoting U.S. national security
objectives, such as countering ideological support for violent extremism.” (ibid.). Congress
recognizes the inextricable relationship between strategic communication and public
diplomacy, which are represented by DOD and DOS respectively in terms of coordinating
U.S. communication endeavor.
DOD and DOS pursue nearly identical goals in operating strategic communication:
understanding, informing, educating, and persuading people abroad to strengthen conditions
favorable for the advancement of U.S. government interests, policies, and objectives.
However, the two government agencies organize different styles when moving toward the
goals. While DOD’s strategic communication is implemented by people in military uniform,
DOS employs civilian staff, mostly diplomats. The White House creates the guideline on
positions, processes, and interagency for the departments in case of working in overlapped
areas, stressing an appropriate balance between civilian and military operations. The White
House announces a process that was “initiated to review existing programs and resources to
identify current military programs that might be better executed by other Departments and
Agencies” (National Framework for Strategic Communication 2010: 1). Still, it is overt that
DOD and DOS have a broad range of tasks to cooperate under the names of strategic
communication and public diplomacy.
There is one government agency not to go unnoticed, linking DOD and DOS to the overall
goal of U.S. strategic communication. The Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) aiming
to support U.S. strategic communication objectives was established in 1999 after the
dissolution of United States Information Agency. BBG legally protected as an independent
government news agency oversees U.S. international broadcasting while incorporating its
five broadcast entities: Voice of America (VOA), the Middle East Broadcasting Networks,
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Free Asia, and the Office of Cuba Broadcasting (US
Government Accountability Office 2009: 6). In accordance with the strategic communication
objectivities of the two departments, BBG operates 60 foreign language services to “engage,
inform, and influence the attitudes and behaviors of global audiences in support of U.S.
strategic interests” (ibid.). Monopolizing the five influential media entities, BBG in general
makes an acknowledged contribution to strategic communication with the wishful mission in
attracting support of foreign audiences for the two departments and the government. But
BBG has been under severe criticism because of its weak and disappointing performance.
Senator Tom Coburn argues, “The BBG is the most worthless organization in the federal
government (…) full of people who know nothing about media or foreign policy. All they are
doing is spending money and somebody's got to look into it” (Rogin 2010). It is desperately
necessary for BBG to create effective news frame strategy reinforcing and representing
values of the United States to achieve its mission before external powers dissolve it.
Strategic communication from the perspectives of the government agencies and the White
House is an essentially existing incorporation of tactics, plans, and operations not only to
foster mutual interests between the United States and foreign countries but also to create
international support of foreign audiences through persuasion, information engagement, and
education. At this point, the term strategic communication -- albeit vague and nebulous -leads to a strong assurance to the conceptualization of the U.S. foreign policy-making. In
other words, the U.S. government-driven concept and theory of strategic communication
leads to implementation of actions for national interests unlike other private actors who
pursue individual interests. Therefore this study tried to show that the concept and theory of
strategic communication offered by the government agencies needs to be privileged over any
other non-government-driven concept and theory of strategic communication.
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